The Constant Gardener

The Constant Gardener is a 2005 political thriller film directed by Fernando Meirelles. The screenplay by Jeffrey Caine is based on the John le Carré novel of the same name. The film follows Justin Quayle (Ralph Fiennes), a British diplomat … Continue reading

The Constant Gardener is a 2005 political thriller film directed by Fernando Meirelles. The screenplay by Jeffrey Caine is based on the John le Carré novel of the same name. The film follows Justin Quayle (Ralph Fiennes), a British diplomat in Kenya, as he tries to solve the murder of his wife Tessa (Rachel Weisz), an Amnesty activist, alternating with many flashbacks telling the story of their love.

The film also stars Hubert Koundé, Danny Huston, Bill Nighy and Donald Sumpter. It was filmed on location in Loiyangalani and theslums of Kibera, a section of Nairobi, Kenya. Circumstances in the area affected the cast and crew to the extent that they set up theConstant Gardener Trust in order to provide basic education for these villages. The plot was vaguely based on a real-life case in Kano, Nigeria. The DVD versions were released in the United States on 1 January 2006 and in the United Kingdom on 13 March 2006. Justin’s gentle but diligent attention to his plants is a recurring background theme, from which image the film’s title is derived

Chocolate Cake

Here Won’t Get You There. (Here’s What Has To Change.) Action Trumps Everything CONTRIBUTOR GROUP Succeeding in the new workplace (and life). Paul B. BrownPaul B. Brown One of the oldest saying among comedians is “buy the premise, buy the … Continue reading

Here Won’t Get You There. (Here’s What Has To Change.)

Action Trumps Everything CONTRIBUTOR GROUP
Succeeding in the new workplace (and life).

Paul B. BrownPaul B. Brown

One of the oldest saying among comedians is “buy the premise, buy the bit.”

Stand Up Comedy – Bill Cosby – Chocolate Cake for Breakfast

Pen and Ink Cross Hatching Masters Edition

Published on Mar 7, 2013
In the long-awaited sequel to Pen and Ink Crosshatching master illustrator Dan Nelson describes and demonstrates his refined cross-hatching technique.

Published on Mar 7, 2013
In the long-awaited sequel to Pen and Ink Crosshatching master illustrator Dan Nelson describes and demonstrates his refined cross-hatching technique.

Theory of Change

The Center for Theory of Change is a non-profit organization established to promote quality standards and best practice for the development and implementation of Theory of Change, with a particular focus on its use and application in the areas of … Continue reading

The Center for Theory of Change is a non-profit organization established to promote quality standards and best practice for the development and implementation of Theory of Change, with a particular focus on its use and application in the areas of international development, sustainability, education, human rights and social change.

Theory of Change (ToC) is a specific type of methodology for planning, participation, and evaluation that is used in the philanthropy, not-for-profit and government sectors to promote social change. Theory of Change defines long-term goals and then maps backward to identify necessary preconditions.[1]

Theory of Change explains the process of change by outlining causal linkages in an initiative, i.e., its shorter-term, intermediate, and longer-term outcomes. The identified changes are mapped –as the “outcomes pathway” – showing each outcome in logical relationship to all the others, as well as chronological flow. The links between outcomes are explained by “rationales” or statements of why one outcome is thought to be a prerequisite for another.[2]

The innovation of Theory of Change lies (1) in making the distinction between desired and actual outcomes, and (2) in requiring stakeholders to model their desired outcomes before they decide on forms of intervention to achieve those outcomes. A common error in describing Theory of Change is the belief that it is simply a methodology for planning and evaluation.[3] Theory of Change is instead a form of critical theory that ensures a transparent distribution of power dynamics. Further, the process is necessarily inclusive of many perspectives and participants in achieving solutions.

Theory of Change can begin at any stage of an initiative, depending on the intended use. A theory developed at the outset is best at informing the planning of an initiative. Having worked out a change model, practitioners can make more informed decisions about strategy and tactics. As monitoring and evaluation data become available, stakeholders can periodically refine the Theory of Change as the evidence indicates. A Theory of Change can be developed retrospectively by reading program documents, talking to stakeholders and analyzing data. This is often done during evaluations reflecting what has worked or not in order to understand the past and plan for the future.

Caso Philip Morris contra Uruguay

The Philip Morris v. Uruguay case (Spanish: Caso Philip Morris contra Uruguay) started on 19 February 2010, when the multinational tobacco company Philip Morris International filed a complaint against Uruguay.[1] The company complains that Uruguay’s anti-smoking legislation devalues its cigarette … Continue reading

The Philip Morris v. Uruguay case (Spanish: Caso Philip Morris contra Uruguay) started on 19 February 2010, when the multinational tobacco company Philip Morris International filed a complaint against Uruguay.[1] The company complains that Uruguay’s anti-smoking legislation devalues its cigarette trademarks and investments in the country and is suing Uruguay for compensation under the bilateral investment treaty between Switzerland and Uruguay.[2] (Philip Morris is headquartered inLausanne.)[3] The treaty provides that disputes are settled by binding arbitration before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

Uruguay had received accolades from the World Health Organization and from anti-smoking activists for its anti-smoking campaign.[4]

The is-ought problem

The is-ought problem, as articulated by Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume (1711–76), states that many writers make claims about what ought to be on the basis of statements about what is. Hume found that there seems to be a … Continue reading

The is-ought problem, as articulated by Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume (1711–76), states that many writers make claims about what ought to be on the basis of statements about what is. Hume found that there seems to be a significant difference betweenpositive statements (about what is) and prescriptive or normative statements (about what ought to be), and that it is not obvious how one can coherently move from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones. The is–ought problem is also known as Hume’s law, or Hume’s guillotine.

A similar view is defended by G. E. Moore‘s open-question argument, intended to refute any identification of moral properties with naturalproperties. This so-called naturalistic fallacy stands in contrast to the views of ethical naturalists.

humans are animals

The Moral Status of Animals First published Tue Jul 1, 2003; substantive revision Mon Sep 13, 2010 What is distinctive about humanity such that humans are thought to have moral status and non-humans do not? Providing an answer to this … Continue reading

The Moral Status of Animals
First published Tue Jul 1, 2003; substantive revision Mon Sep 13, 2010

What is distinctive about humanity such that humans are thought to have moral status and non-humans do not? Providing an answer to this question has become increasingly important among philosophers as well as those outside of philosophy who are interested in our treatment of non-human animals. For some, answering this question will enable us to better understand the nature of human beings and the proper scope of our moral obligations. Some argue that there is an answer that can distinguish humans from the rest of the natural world. Many of those who accept this answer are interested in justifying certain human practices towards non-humans—practices that cause pain, discomfort, suffering and death. This latter group expect that in answering the question in a particular way, humans will be justified in granting moral consideration to other humans that is neither required nor justified when considering non-human animals. In contrast to this view, many philosophers have argued that while humans are different in a variety of ways from each other and other animals, these differences do not provide a philosophical defense for denying non-human animals moral consideration. What the basis of moral consideration is and what it amounts to has been the source of much disagreement.

The species Homo sapiens share a genetic make-up and a distinctive physiology, but this is unimportant from the moral point of view. Species membership itself cannot support the view that members of one species, namely ours, deserve moral consideration that is not owed to members of other species. Humans are morally considerable because of the distinctively human capacities we possess. But which capacities are only human? There is no activity that is uncontroversially unique to humans. Both scholarly and popular work on animal behavior suggests that many of the activities that are thought to be distinct to humans occur in non-humans. Darwin brought us closer to the animal world, but equally brought animal nature closer to us. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/ ).

The notion of personhood identifies a category of morally considerable beings that is thought to be coextensive with humanity. Historically, Kant is the most noted defender of personhood as the quality that makes a being valuable and thus morally considerable. Yet Kant’s view of personhood cannot distinguish all and only humans as morally considerable. Some humans are not persons, i.e. infants, children, people with advanced forms of autism or Alzheimer’s disease or other cognitive disorders—do not have the rational, self-reflective capacities associated with personhood.

More to the point, rationality itself is suspect as a basis for moral right. On one hand, human rationality is bounded by lower level instincts and mechanistic behavior, and on the other, non-humans exhibit behavior that can be deemed moral. Thus morality is orthogonal to rationality. As a matter of fact, individuals that are hyper rational and lack lower level motional control of their behaviors are nor deemed highly moral, but rather are characterized as psychopathic (http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/04/29/psychopaths-and-rational-moral/ ).

Al Dunlap [That would be “Chainsaw” Al Dunlap, former CEO of Sunbeam and notorious downsizer.] effortlessly turns the psychopath checklist into “Who Moved My Cheese?” Many items on the checklist he redefines into a manual of how to do well in capitalism. There was his reputation that he was a man who seemed to enjoy firing people, not to mention the stories from his first marriage — telling his first wife he wanted to know what human flesh tastes like, not going to his parents’ funerals. Then you realize that because of this dysfunctional capitalistic society we live in those things were positives. He was hailed and given high-powered jobs, and the more ruthlessly his administration behaved, the more his share price shot up.

Some models of human behavior in the social sciences assume that humans can be reasonably approximated or described as “rational” entities (see for example rational choice theory, or Downs Political Agency Models). Many economics models assume that people are on average rational, and can in large enough quantities be approximated to act according to their preferences. The concept of bounded rationality revises this assumption to account for the fact that perfectly rational decisions are often not feasible in practice because of the finite computational resources available for making them.

Bounded rationality is the idea that when individuals make decisions, their rationality is limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the time available to make the decision (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bounded_rationality ).

If morality is defined in terms of social behavior, non-humans exhibit different moral behavioral modes (http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals?%ca&language=en ). Social life may be regarded as a sort of symbiosis among individuals of the same species: a society is composed of a group of individuals belonging to the same species living within well-defined rules. When biologists interested in evolution theory first started examining social behavior, some apparently unanswerable questions arose, such as how the birth of sterile castes, like in bees, could be explained through an evolving mechanism that emphasizes the reproductive success of as many individuals as possible, or why, amongst animals living in small groups like squirrels, an individual would risk its own life to save the rest of the group. These behaviors may be examples of altruism. Revengeful behavior has been reported in non Homo sapiens (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethology ).

Humans are animals in ways so subtly that we are unaware of it. Humans are subject to the same instinctual drives and influences as other animals are; it’s only human arrogance that would ever lead us to think otherwise. Fifty to seventy percent of the variation between individuals – in intelligence, in personality, in political leanings, or just about any other mental character you care to name – derives from the genes; zero to ten percent derives from the home environment; and the mysterious remainder is due to chance or to non-parental environment. (The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature by Steven Pinker)

The understanding that other people’s emotional states depend on the fulfillment of their intention is fundamentally important for responding adequately to others. Psychopathic patients show severe deficits in responding adequately to other people’s emotion. Psychopaths can teach us a lot about the nature of morality. At first glance, they seem to have perfectly functioning minds. Their working memory isn’t impaired, they have excellent language skills, and they don’t have reduced attention spans. In fact, a few studies have found that psychopaths have above-average IQs and reasoning abilities; their logic is impeccable. But the disorder is associated with a severe moral deficit. (http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/04/29/psychopaths-and-rational-moral/ ).

So what’s gone wrong? Why are psychopaths so much more likely to use violence to achieve their goals? Why are they so overrepresented in our prisons? The answer turns us to the anatomy of morality in the mind. That’s because the intact intelligence of psychopaths conceals a devastating problem: the emotional parts of their brains are damaged, and this is what makes them dangerous.

When normal people are shown violent imagery or other painful stimulus, they automatically generate a visceral emotional reaction. Their hands start to sweat, and their blood pressure surges. But psychopaths feel nothing. When you peer inside the psychopathic brain, you can literally see this absence of emotion. After being exposed to fearful facial expressions, the emotional parts of the normal human brain show increased levels of activation. So do the cortical areas responsible for recognizing faces. As a result, a frightened face becomes a frightening sight; we naturally internalize the feelings of others. The brains of psychopaths, however, respond to these fearful faces with utter disinterest.

I am more inclined to take the position of Schopenhauer. For him, all individual animals, including humans, are essentially the same, being phenomenal manifestations of the one underlying Will. The word “will” designated, for him, force, power, impulse, energy, and desire; it is the closest word we have that can signify both the real essence of all external things and also our own direct, inner experience. Since everything is basically Will, then humans and animals are fundamentally the same and can recognize themselves in each other. For this reason, he claimed that a good person would have sympathy for animals, who are our fellow sufferers (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Schopenhauer ).

Schopenhauer emphasizes the necessity of finding a basis for Ethics that appeals, not to the intellect, but to the intuitive perception (http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Basis_of_Morality/Translator%27s_Introduction ). According to Schopenhauer, the end of Ethics is not to treat of that which people ought to do (for ” ought ” has no place except in theological Morals, whether explicit, or implicit)

Eugen Bertolt Friedrich Brecht

Eugen Bertolt Friedrich Brecht (/brɛkt/;[1][2][3] 10 February 1898 – 14 August 1956[4]) was a German poet, playwright, and theatre director of the 20th century. He made contributions to dramaturgy and theatrical production, the latter through the tours undertaken by the Berliner … Continue reading

Eugen Bertolt Friedrich Brecht (/br?kt/;[1][2][3] 10 February 1898 – 14 August 1956[4]) was a German poet, playwright, and theatre director of the 20th century. He made contributions to dramaturgy and theatrical production, the latter through the tours undertaken by the Berliner Ensemble – the post-war theatre company operated by Brecht and his wife, long-time collaborator and actressHelene Weigel.[5]

Dietrich Bonhoeffer

Dietrich Bonhoeffer (German: [ˈdiːtʁɪç ˈboːnhœfɐ]; 4 February 1906 – 9 April 1945) was a German Lutheran pastor, theologian, anti-Nazi dissident, and key founding member of the Confessing Church. His writings on Christianity’s role in the secular world have become widely … Continue reading

Dietrich Bonhoeffer (German: [?di?t??ç ?bo?nhœf?]; 4 February 1906 – 9 April 1945) was a German Lutheran pastor, theologian, anti-Nazi dissident, and key founding member of the Confessing Church. His writings on Christianity’s role in the secular world have become widely influential, and his book The Cost of Discipleship became a modern classic.[1]

Apart from his theological writings, Bonhoeffer was known for his staunch resistance to the Nazi dictatorship, including vocal opposition to Hitler’s euthanasia program and genocidal persecution of the Jews.[2] He was arrested in April 1943 by the Gestapoand imprisoned at Tegel prison for one and a half years. Later he was transferred to a Nazi concentration camp. After being associated with the plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler, he was quickly tried, along with other accused plotters, including former members of the Abwehr (the German Military Intelligence Office), and then executed by hanging on 9 April 1945 as the Nazi regime was collapsing.